국제신용평가사 무디스(Moody's)가 27일 우리나라의 국가신용등급을 기존의 'A1'에서 'Aa3'로 상향 조정하고 전망을 '안정적'으로 제시했다.

'Aa3' 등급은 무디스가 우리나라에 국가신용등급을 부여한 이래 사상 최고의 등급이다. 무디스가 'Aa3' 등급에 올려놓은 국가는 중국, 일본, 사우디아라비아, 대만, 벨기에, 칠레 등이다.

이번 상향 조정은 위기대응 능력 등 현 정부의 경제운용이 객관적으로 긍정적 평가를 받았음을 의미한다. 무디스는 특히 우리 정부의 △건전재정 기조 △거시건전정 3종 세트 △가계부채 종합대책 등 전반적인 위기관리 노력을 높게 평가했다.

최근 주요국의 국가신용등급과 전망이 강등되는 추세에서 우리나라의 등급이 상향된 것은 이례적이다. 무디스가 올해 들어 A등급 이상 국가들에 대해 등급이나 전망을 상향 조정한 사례는 한 차례도 없었다.

이에 따라 향후 스탠더드앤드푸어스(S&P), 피치(Fitch) 등 다른 국제신용평가사의 등급 발표에도 긍정적인 영향을 미칠 수 있을 것으로 기획재정부는 기대하고 있다.

국가신용등급이 'A1'에서 'Aa3'로 조정된 것은 단순히 한 등급의 상향을 넘어 'A(싱글A)' 등급에서 'AA(더블A)' 등급으로 한단계 올라섰음을 의미한다.

'A' 등급은 신용도는 높으나 예외적으로 금전적 의무이행 가능성이 저하될 수 있음을 뜻한다. 'AA'는 신용도가 높음을, 'AAA'는 신용도가 매우 높음을 상징한다.

재정부는 "이번 상향 조정은 무디스가 한국경제의 펀더멘털이 명실상부한 경제 선진국으로 도약한 것으로 평가한 것"이라며 "여러 측면에서 우리 경제에 긍정적인 효과를 가져다 줄 것으로 기대된다"고 밝혔다.

우선, 대외신인도가 높아져 금융기관 및 기업의 해외자금조달 여건이 개선될 것으로 보인다. 특히 글로벌 금융시장의 불안 요인이 남아있는 상황임을 감안할 때, 은행 및 기업들의 자금조달 측면에서 긍정적 효과가 있을 전망이다.

재정부는 "우리나라 금융기관 등의 등급 및 전망에도 긍정적 영향을 줄 것"이라며 "해외투자자들의 투자심리를 개선하는 효과도 기대하고 있다"고 말했다.

무디스 측 보도자료 원문

Moody's upgrades Korea to Aa3; outlook stable

Singapore, August 27, 2012 -- Moody's Investors Service has today upgraded the
Republic of Korea’'s government bond rating to Aa3 from A1. The rating outlook is
stable.

The key drivers of the rating action are:
1. Strong fiscal fundamentals,
2. A high degree of economic resilience and competitiveness,
3. Reduced external vulnerability of the banking sector, and
4. Continuation of status-quo in North-South geopolitics.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Firstly, Korea’'s strong fiscal fundamentals enable a relatively large degree of policy space to cope with contingent domestic risks and external shocks. Its government finance metrics are very well placed among all Aa-rated peers.

The government’'s balance sheet has been relatively unscathed by the global financial crisis and, so far, by the eurozone crisis. The general government budget went into a modest deficit in 2009 as a result of the global financial crisis, but swiftly bounced back into surplus in 2010, and has remained in the black since then. Government debt has been contained at a moderate level in relation to GDP.

The above factors are reflected in Korea’'s very low gross financing requirement, which at 0.9% of GDP in 2012, according to the International Monetary Fund, is among the lowest for an industrialized economy. Over the medium term, Moody’'s sees the government’'s debt trajectory gradually declining.
Moreover, the outlook for government finances is favorable. The large size of Korea’'s domestic capital market, low inflation, a low risk premium on government securities, and a relatively favorable long-term outlook for economic growth mean that fundamental pressures on the government’'s debt-carrying capacity are notably absent.

Secondly, the Korean economy has demonstrated resilience to external shocks. It
avoided a recession because of the global financial crisis in 2009, and rebounded
strongly in 2010. Korea’'s trend growth has become closely aligned with that of global growth in the past decade, and is therefore stronger than that of the advanced industrial countries.

Korea’'s economic growth rate this year is slowing with the downturn in global growth, but the competitiveness of its export sector will help lead a rebound as the global economy recovers. Despite these headwinds, the country’'s labor market has remained relatively healthy—-the unemployment rate was 3.1% in July. Over the long run, continued gains in labor productivity and restraint in unit labor costs will be essential in maintaining the economy’'s competitiveness and its potential growth rate, which is close to 4%.

Thirdly, macro-prudential regulatory measures and improved risk management have
proved effective in reducing banking sector vulnerabilities. The risks associated with a heavy reliance on off-shore wholesale market funding became evident during the global financial crisis. Since then, banks' have appreciably reduced their reliance on short term external funding as a share of total external liabilities; loan-to-deposit ratios for the regulated banks; as well as for the policy banks; have declined to a more prudent level.

Related to this issue is the presence of system-wide self-insurance against deleveraging and risk aversion in the global financial markets. Official foreign exchange reserves have risen and have remained above $300 billion since April 2011; standing near a record level of $314 billion as of July 2012. In contrast, during the global financial crisis, they had plummeted to $201 billion.

Fourthly, the rating action is supported by a developing outlook which suggests that the geopolitical status quo will not be adversely disrupted by the ongoing leadership transition in Pyongyang. However, a possible step-up in Pyongyang’'s economic engagement with Beijing, as seen in the announcement of three new industrial zones along the China-North Korea border, suggests that the risk of an collapse of the autarkic communist state during the leadership transition phase is diminishing. Furthermore, the risks relating to renewed military conflict on the Korean peninsula are contained by the long-standing deterrence provided by Seoul’'s robust alliance with Washington.

North Korea-related event risks factored into our Sovereign Bond methodology do not constrain the Republic of Korea’'s rating at the Aa3 level.

RATING CONCERNS

The recent intensification of the economic weakness in the eurozone and the slowdown in China’'s growth is adversely affecting Korea’'s exports, a key growth driver. Moody’'s thinks that continued weakness in the eurozone will likely lead to a lower real GDP growth outturn for this year than previously expected, around 2.5% but still with downside risks Nonetheless, Korea’'s credit fundamentals would not be negatively affected at its current rating range.

Concerns over the rise in non-financial public-sector debt since 2007 are being allayed by recent policy actions, although effective management of public corporation liabilities remains a concern which could affect the future rating trajectory. Transparency and accountability will be enhanced by the government’'s new mandate that public corporations submit five-year financial management plans to the Ministry of Strategy and Finance—-done in June—-and which are to be vetted before the National Assembly in September 2012.

Mitigating to some extent the risk from the rise in public corporation debt is the
offsetting rise in public sector assets. Much of the borrowings by the state-owned
corporations have supported the development of resources overseas and energy
infrastructure at home. Such projects will generate revenues in the future. Other
investments have improved social welfare services, such as increasing the supply of
affordable housing.

Concerns over rising household debt remain salient, but we do not consider that such debt poses near-term risks to the banking sector, or to the government’'s balance sheet, if it is contained. Rather, our immediate concerns center on the potential for a drag on private consumption expenditure and, therefore, whether the high degree of resilience in the Korean economy would be impaired.

The change in government bond rating to Aa3 also results in changes in: the foreign currency bond ceiling to Aa1 from Aa2, and the foreign currency bank deposit ceiling to Aa3 from A1. The P-1 rating on short-term obligations remains unchanged, as does the Aa1 ceiling on local currency bond and bank deposit ratings.

CREDIT TRIGGERS FOR A FUTURE RATING ACTION
The stable outlook means that upside and downside risks are balanced. Factors that
could lead to a positive rating action:
1. Further reduction of the banking sector’'s vulnerability to external funding,
2. Reduction in the contingent risks to the government’'s balance sheet, and which result
from non-financial public enterprise debt, or from household debt,
3. Maintenance of fundamental economic competitiveness and of long-term growth
prospects.

Factors that could lead to a negative rating action:
1. A significant or irreversible deterioration in the government’'s balance sheet either
from budgetary slippage, or from the fiscalization of contingent liabilities,
2. A fra